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Abstract 
 
We examine how the reduction in information asymmetry brought about by the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects the adverse selection costs of issuing equity at home and 
abroad.  In particular, we examine whether there has been a reduction in the costs of raising equity in 
foreign markets- the capital markets liability of foreignness (CMLOF).  Consistent with the view that 
mandatory IFRS adoption reduces information asymmetry, we find an increase in equity issues following 
IFRS adoption.  In addition, we find an increase in the probability of firms issuing equity (and in the 
amount of equity raised) in foreign markets following IFRS adoption, suggesting a reduction in CMLOF 
costs.  These results are more pronounced for smaller firms, with lower analyst coverage, and for firms 
with more need of external finance.  Finally, we find lower adverse reaction to the announcement of 
equity offerings in foreign markets following IFRS adoption. 
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1. Introduction 
The information asymmetry problems between managers and outside investors make it expensive for 
firms to issue equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  These problems are exacerbated when firms raise capital 
in foreign markets.  In addition to the information asymmetry problems associated with raising funds 
through equity offerings, when firms raise capital in foreign markets they face additional obstacles.  Bell, 
Filatotchev, and Rasheed (2012) describe the costs that foreign firms face in accessing foreign capital 
markets as the capital market liability of foreignness (CMLOF).  In addition to information asymmetry, 
these include institutional distance, difficulties in information gathering, unfamiliarity, and cultural 
distance.  These costs result in a disadvantage for foreign firms relative to domestic firms when raising 
capital in foreign markets, which discourages firms from issuing equity abroad and could result in firms 
forgoing valuable investment opportunities when they are financially constrained, especially for firms 
from countries with limited capital markets.  While firms can employ various strategies to mitigate costs 
associated with accessing capital markets, such as bonding to tougher regulatory regimes by listing in 
foreign exchanges with better investor protection (Coffee 1999; Stulz 1999; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 
2004), changes in the institutional environment of a country can also help to reduce costs associated with 
CMLOF by improving, among others, the quality, accessibility, and comparability of financial 
information.  In this study we focus on the latter and explore whether a major change in the institutional 
environment of a country, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the 
events surrounding this major development, leads to a reduction in information asymmetry and CMLOF 
costs that make issuing equity in foreign markets cost prohibitive. 
The adoption of IFRS is one of the most important developments in reporting standards in history.  
International Financial Reporting Standards were designed primarily to provide more accurate, 
comprehensive, and timely financial statement information, and to reduce international differences in 
accounting standards by standardizing reporting formats.  Existing literature documents that IFRS require 
greater disclosure and are more comprehensive than local accounting standards (Ashbaugh and Pincus 
2001; Ding et al. 2007) and improve the comparability of firms across markets, which improves capital 
allocation efficiency (Covrig et al. 2007; Armstrong et al. 2010).  Improved disclosure should reduce 
information asymmetry, enhance liquidity and reduce the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; 
Easley and O'Hara 2004).  Consistent with this view, several studies document reductions in cost of 
capital associated with both mandatory and voluntary IFRS adoption (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Daske 
et al. 2008; Li 2010; Daske et al. 2011).  These studies emphasize the importance of both enforcement 
and firms' reporting incentives on the impact of IFRS adoption.   
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In this paper, we examine how the adoption of IFRS and its potential reduction in information 
asymmetry affects subsequent equity offerings.  We explore four hypotheses related to the impact of IFRS 
adoption on a firm’s ability to raise capital through equity issues.  First, we posit that the adoption of 
IFRS should lead to an increase in equity issues as a result of an improved information environment.  This 
is likely to happen because the informational asymmetry between managers and investors described in 
Myers and Majluf (1984) will be mitigated once investors have access to better and more accurate 
financial information.  Thus, the cost of issuing equity will decline and firms will be more inclined to 
raise funds in the equity markets.  Second, we hypothesize that IFRS adoption should lead to an increase 
in equity issuances in foreign markets as a result of a reduction in the costs associated with the capital 
market liability of foreignness (CMLOF).  One of the objectives of IFRS is to reduce international 
differences in accounting standards by standardizing reporting formats.  This should improve the 
comparability of firms across countries and should make it easier and less costly for foreign investors to 
analyze firms’ financial statements, which should reduce one of the main sources of CMLOF, difficulties 
in information gathering.  Third, we examine whether the impact of IFRS adoption on subsequent foreign 
equity issues is more pronounced for more opaque and more financially constrained firms.  Such firms 
stand to gain the most from an improvement in the information environment in their home country 
because they are the ones with higher ex-ante CMLOF costs.
2
  Finally, we conjecture that IFRS adoption 
should lead to a decline in the adverse stock price reaction to the announcement of foreign equity issues.  
If the adoption of IFRS leads to improvements in disclosure, managers will be able to convey information 
to investors in a less costly manner, reducing information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf 1984).  Having 
access to more accurate information, investors would be better able to determine whether management is 
acting in their own interest (e.g. by issuing equity when the stock price is overvalued) when making a 
decision to issue equity.   
We test our hypotheses using a sample of 41,599 firm-year observations from 28 countries over the 
period 1991 through 2010.  Our sample includes countries that have adopted IFRS or allow firms to use 
IFRS and have committed to adopt IFRS in the future.  We find evidence consistent with our four 
hypotheses.  In line with our first hypothesis, we document a significant increase in equity issuances 
following IFRS adoption across our sample of firms.  In addition, we find that all else equal, the 
probability that a firm issues equity increases significantly following IFRS adoption.  We also find 
support for our second hypothesis and document significant increases in equity issuances and in the 
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probability of issuing equity in foreign markets following IFRS adoption, suggesting that IFRS adoption 
may reduce international differences in accounting standards and improve comparability of financial 
statements, which may lower some of the sources of CMLOF costs.  We also find that smaller firms and 
those with lower analyst coverage and more need of external finance experience a larger increase in 
equity issuances in foreign markets following IFRS adoption, which is consistent with our third 
hypothesis.  Finally, in line with our fourth hypothesis we show that the adverse price reaction to foreign 
equity issues drops significantly following IFRS adoption, consistent with a reduction in CMLOF costs 
post-IFRS.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, we provide additional evidence 
supporting the impact of IFRS adoption by examining another avenue through which IFRS adoption can 
impact a firm – its decision and ability to issue equity at home and abroad.  Our findings complement 
earlier studies documenting positive capital market effects associated with IFRS adoption (Daske et al. 
2008, 2009; Li, 2010).  To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study that examines how IFRS 
adoption may impact a firm’s ability to issue equity in foreign markets.  In addition, we contribute to the 
recent strand of literature on the capital market liability of foreignness by testing whether institutional 
changes in the home country reduce CMLOF costs.  To this end, we provide evidence of a significant 
reduction in CMLOF costs following IFRS adoption that improves firms’ ability to raise equity in foreign 
markets.  The evidence presented here underscores the importance of improving the information 
environment in reducing firms’ costs of issuing equity at home and abroad.  The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows.  We review the literature and develop the hypotheses tested in the paper in section 
2.  In section 3 we describe the data and methodology used to test the various hypotheses.  In section 4 we 
present our main results; we provide a discussion of some robustness tests in section 5 and conclude in 
section 6.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
 
i. Equity Issuance and the Capital Market Liability of Foreignness (CMLOF) 
As Myers and Majluf (1984) argue, firms find it costly to raise capital through equity issuances 
because of the severe information asymmetry problems between manager insiders and outside investors.  
As Stulz (1999) explains, there are two problems that managers face when raising equity to finance new 
projects.  The first is the information asymmetry problem that arises because manager insiders have more 
information about their firms’ prospects than outside investors.  Second, there is an agency problem that 
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exists given that managers have incentives to both issue equity when they feel that the firm’s stock is 
overvalued and to invest in value-destroying projects (e.g. to obtain perks, such as higher salaries, 
associated with managing larger firms).  Anticipating this, the market reacts adversely (by discounting the 
stock price) to the announcement of equity offerings.  The information asymmetry problems lead to 
adverse selection costs that increase the cost of raising capital.  The result is the widely documented 
adverse reaction to seasoned equity offerings (SEO) announcements as well as the underpricing of SEOs 
(see e.g. Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986; Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and Hansen, 
2003) 
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The problems associated with issuing equity are exacerbated when firms raise capital in foreign 
markets.  Firms issuing equity abroad face additional obstacles because local investors tend to be less 
familiar and have less information about foreign firms.  Bell et al. (2012) argue that the costs that foreign 
firms face in accessing foreign capital markets can be attributed to what they term the capital market 
liability of foreignness (CMLOF).
4
  In addition to information asymmetry, the costs associated with 
CMLOF include institutional distance, difficulties in information gathering, unfamiliarity, and cultural 
distance.  There is well documented evidence that foreign firms face CMLOF costs when accessing 
foreign capital markets.  For example, Francis, Hasan, Lothian, and Sun (2010) find that foreign firms 
from segmented markets with high information asymmetry experience larger underpricing at IPOs.  
Investors’ preference for domestic securities - the “home bias” puzzle- also suggests that foreign firms 
may have a hard time tapping into foreign capital markets.  There is a vast literature that documents the 
home bias and attempts to explain this puzzle (e.g. Kho, Stulz, and Warnock, 2009; Kang and Stulz, 
1997).
5
 
Given the problems associated with issuing equity, firms that need to access capital markets tend to 
engage in various strategies in an attempt to mitigate these adverse selection costs.  For example, the 
bonding hypothesis (Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999) suggests that a way for firms to credibly commit to 
the protection of minority shareholders is to cross-list in countries with stronger investor protection.  
Reese and Weisbach (2002) provide evidence consistent with the bonding hypothesis and find that equity 
issuances increase subsequent to cross-listing, especially for firms from countries with weak shareholder 
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protection.
6
  We follow a similar approach in testing our hypotheses.  IFRS adoption in the home country 
should lead to a reduction in the costs associated with difficulties in information gathering for local (host 
country) investors, which are a major source of CMLOF.  The impact should be stronger for firms with 
higher ex-ante information asymmetry (e.g. smaller firms, with lower analyst coverage), who face higher 
CMLOF costs.  Better quality of accounting information, improved disclosure, and enhanced 
comparability of financial statements across countries should lead to a reduction in both the information 
asymmetry and the agency costs associated with raising equity to finance new projects, especially in 
foreign markets.   
ii. International Financial Reporting Standards and Reduction in Information Asymmetry 
One of the documented benefits surrounding the adoption of IFRS has been the reduction in 
information asymmetry.  IFRS were designed primarily to provide more accurate, comprehensive, and 
timely financial statement information, and to reduce international differences in accounting standards by 
standardizing reporting formats.  Existing literature documents that IFRS require greater disclosure and 
are more comprehensive than local accounting standards (Ashbaugh & Pincus 2001; Ding et al. 2007) and 
improve the comparability of firms across markets, which improves capital allocation efficiency (Covrig 
et al. 2007; Armstrong et al. 2010).  This improved disclosure should reduce information asymmetry, 
enhance liquidity and reduce the cost of capital (Diamond & Verrecchia 1991; Easley & O'Hara 2004).  
Consistent with the view that IFRS or events surrounding its adoption lead to a reduction in information 
asymmetry, several studies document reductions in cost of capital associated with both mandatory and 
voluntary IFRS adoption (Leuz & Verrecchia 2000; Daske et al. 2008; Daske et al. 2011; Li 2010) as well 
as increases in analyst forecast accuracy (Tan et al. 2011).  These studies emphasize the importance of 
both enforcement and firms' reporting incentives on the impact of IFRS adoption.  In addition, Armstrong 
et al. (2010) document incrementally positive reactions associated with events related to IFRS adoption 
for firms with lower pre-adoption information quality and higher information asymmetry, which suggests 
that investors perceive that IFRS will lead to improvements in information quality.   
While the literature documents evidence that points to a reduction in information asymmetry around 
IFRS adoption, it is not clear whether IFRS adoption itself or events surrounding IFRS adoption drive the 
results.  Christensen et al. (2012) for example, note that the capital market effects around IFRS adoption 
can be attributed to contemporaneous changes in reporting enforcement that occurred in five European 
Union countries.  For the purposes of this study, whether the improvement in the information 
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environment can be attributed to IFRS adoption itself or to events surrounding its adoption is not crucial, 
as long as there is a reduction in information asymmetry and informational costs. 
Providing further support for the reduction in information asymmetry around the adoption of IFRS, in 
a related paper Naranjo, Saavedra, and Verdi (2012) test the pecking order theory using IFRS adoption as 
an exogenous shock to the information environment.  Similar to our study, they document that firms are 
more likely to seek external financing post-IFRS, and that for those firms raising external capital, they are 
more likely to raise equity than debt.  Unlike us, they do not examine how IFRS adoption impacts the 
costs of CMLOF.  They do not test whether firms are more likely to issue equity abroad following IFRS 
adoption, nor do they test for changes in the market reaction to equity issues in foreign markets following 
IFRS.   
We will also use the adoption of IFRS as an exogenous shock to the information environment to 
examine whether such a shock leads to a reduction in the cost of raising equity, specifically in foreign 
markets.  An increase in the amount and in the probability of equity issuances abroad following IFRS 
adoption would indicate a reduction in the costs associated with CMLOF. 
 
iii. Main Hypotheses 
We will test four hypotheses that rely on arguments relating to the costs associated with issuing 
equity locally and abroad.  First, if the adoption of IFRS or events surrounding its adoption reduce 
information asymmetry, firms should be more likely to issue equity following IFRS adoption because the 
adverse selection costs of doing so should decline.  With better information and more transparent 
financial statements, it will be easier for investors to assess the firm’s future prospects (e.g. assess the 
future cash flows of new investments) and managers will find it easier and less costly to relay information 
to investors.  In addition, improvements in disclosure quality should reduce the costs associated with 
monitoring management’s activities.  Thus, we posit that firms will be more likely to issue equity post-
IFRS and that the amount of equity issuances will also increase.  With this in mind, we formulate our first 
hypothesis: 
H1: Equity issuances should increase following IFRS adoption, ceteris paribus.  
The improved quality of information and comparability of financial statements across countries 
brought about by the implementation of similar accounting standards should also reduce the cost of 
obtaining information for investors.  As Bell et al. (2012) argue, local investors have a lot more 
7 
 
information and better knowledge about domestic firms and they face more barriers when attempting to 
obtain information about foreign firms.  Thus, these information costs are a main source of CMLOF.  
With more comparable financial statements and more accurate information, local investors in host 
countries will find it easier and less costly to obtain information about foreign firms, which will reduce 
these informational costs, which are an important source of CMLOF.  This reduction in the costs of 
CMLOF should make it easier (and less costly) for firms to issue equity abroad, which leads us to our 
second hypothesis: 
H2: Firms should increase equity issuance in foreign markets post-IFRS because of lower 
CMLOF costs, ceteris paribus. 
The benefits from an improved information environment (e.g. the reduction in the costs of CMLOF) 
should be more pronounced for firms with higher ex-ante information asymmetry.  All else equal, more 
opaque firms would face higher information and unfamiliarity costs associated with raising capital in 
foreign markets.  The degree of CMLOF should be more severe for these smaller, lesser known firms.  A 
large multinational firm may still find it easy to raise capital in a foreign market in which it has large scale 
operations.  Local investors should be more familiar with such a company and more information about the 
firm should be available to them.  In contrast, smaller, lesser-known firms, with lower analyst coverage 
may find it too costly to overcome the high costs of raising capital abroad and may thus refrain from 
tapping into foreign capital markets.  This problem would be exacerbated for firms in dire need of 
external capital (i.e. financially constrained firms).  If capital is limited at home, firms with a need for 
external finance may indeed have to forgo positive net present value (NPV) projects if they face high 
CMLOF costs.  It is these types of firms that would benefit the most from a reduction in information 
asymmetry that reduces the costs of CMLOF.  Thus, we formulate our third hypothesis: 
H3: The increase in equity issuances in foreign markets following IFRS should be stronger for 
more opaque and more financially constrained firms, ceteris paribus. 
The adverse selection costs associated with raising equity capital should go down once information 
quality improves.  Through improvements in disclosure quality managers will be able to convey 
information to investors in a less costly manner and investors will find it less costly to monitor 
management; with better and more accurate information, investors would be better able to determine 
whether managers are acting in their own interest when making a decision to issue equity (e.g. by issuing 
equity when the stock price is overvalued).  With improved transparency and comparability across firms, 
investors will have better information in assessing firms’ growth opportunities and in valuing firms’ 
assets.  The informational advantage that managers have over outside investors will go down, and 
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problems associated with manager’s incentive to issue equity when their stock is overvalued will decline.  
All of this will lower CMLOF costs.  The market should thus react less adversely to new equity issuances, 
especially in foreign markets.  Following this logic, we thus formulate our fourth and final hypothesis: 
H4: The adverse stock price reaction to seasoned equity offerings in foreign markets should be 
less severe post-IFRS. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
We test our four hypotheses using a sample of firms in countries that have adopted IFRS or that allow 
firms to report in accordance with IFRS over the period 1991-2010.  We collect dates of actual and 
planned IFRS adoption for each country in our sample from Deloitte’s IAS Plus and verify these dates 
using various other sources.
7 
  In addition to the mandatory IFRS adoption date in each country, we 
identify the date in which a firm voluntarily adopts IFRS prior to the mandatory adoption year using the 
“Accounting Standards Followed” WorldScope variable, following Daske et al. (2011).  For each of these 
countries, our initial sample consists of all stocks listed in each country’s major stock exchange that are 
covered in Thomson Financial’s DataStream database.  c  We proceed with our data screening by 
eliminating financial and utilities firms and those firms with missing leverage and return on equity 
(ROE).  Moreover, to make firms more comparable across countries, we further eliminate those with 
negative sales or with total assets less than $10 million.  Finally, we exclude countries with less than 10 
firms with available data and all observations with missing data for the variables used in the main 
regressions.
8
  This screening process leads to a final sample of 41,599 firm-year observations from 28 
countries. 
We then collect information on new issues from Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC).  From SDC we collect information on the date of the issue, the proceeds raised from each issue, 
the market in which the security was issued, and whether the issue was strictly domestic, foreign, or 
global (i.e. simultaneous equity issue at home and abroad).  For global issues, we compute the proceeds 
raised in domestic (foreign) markets using the fraction of each global issue raised in the domestic 
(foreign) market, respectively.  For foreign equity issues, the market place of the issue is identified; 
however, the market place of foreign issues is coded as either US or Europe on SDC.  Thus, we cannot 
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identify the foreign country of issue, except for issues that take place in the US.
9
  In constructing our 
sample of SEOs we follow the literature (Corwin 2003) and exclude initial public offerings, unit offers, 
rights, mutual conversions, and equity offerings by closed-end investment funds, real estate investment 
trusts (REITs), unit investment trusts, beneficial interests, and utilities.   
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of equity issues by country and documents the total 
proceeds (domestic and foreign) raised by firms in each country throughout our sample period.  The 
results in Table 1 show that the total proceeds raised by firms in our sample from 1991-2010 amount to 
$556 billion; foreign equity issues comprised about 50.5 percent, or $281 billion.  The average issue size 
is $257 million, implying that as expected, our sample comprises large firms.  The results document an 
increase in the number of issues and in the proceeds raised post-IFRS.  There were a total of 839 equity 
issues totaling $255 billion before IFRS adoption, compared to 1,326 equity issues totaling $301 billion 
following IFRS adoption.   
The results in Table 1 also point to an increase in the number of foreign equity issues post-IFRS (582 
vs. 437), but a decrease in total proceeds raised in foreign markets, which declined from $155 billion to 
$126 billion.  One possible reason for this could be that smaller firms are raising more equity in foreign 
markets following IFRS adoption, which may be an early indication of a reduction in the cost of raising 
capital abroad for such firms.  We test this directly in subsequent analyses.  Note also that given our 
sample period, the pre-IFRS period is substantially longer than our post-IFRS period given that most of 
the countries in our sample adopted IFRS in 2005 or later, as shown in Table 1.  Thus, it is not surprising 
that the total proceeds raised in foreign markets in the pre-IFRS period exceed the proceeds raised post-
IFRS.  We will control for this and more directly test the impact of IFRS adoption on foreign equity 
issues in our subsequent analyses.   
In addition to the data on equity issues, we also collect financial data and other firm level controls 
from WorldScope and IBES databases.  We focus on those firm-specific characteristics motivated by 
prior literature that may affect a firm’s decision to issue equity.  These include leverage (total debt-to-
total assets); the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities; analyst coverage, given that 
firms with more analyst coverage should have lower information asymmetry; the percentage of closely-
held shares to control for ownership structure; the proportion of foreign sales – given that firms with a 
higher proportion of foreign sales may be more likely to raise capital in countries in which they operate.  
We also compute a firm’s need for external financing, given that we posit that such firms may be more 
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affected by changes in the information environment.  We use the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of 
dependence on external finance - (capital expenditures – cash flow from operations) divided by capital 
expenditures.  In some robustness tests, we also use the financing deficit following Frank and Goyal 
(2003) as an additional proxy for firms’ need for external finance.10   
We also use several country-level measures that have been shown to influence equity issues.  These 
include the local annual stock market return, using DataStream’s value-weighted country index; the stock 
market capitalization as a percent of GDP from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009), as a proxy for the size 
of the stock market; GDP per capita and real GDP growth obtained from the World Development 
Indicators, to control for financial development and growth, and the level of exogenous growth 
opportunities (the log of the inner product of the vector of global industry PE ratios and the vector of 
country-specific industry weights) from Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) to capture additional 
factors that may affect equity issues.
11
  These and other variables used in our analyses are defined in 
Appendix A.   
Descriptive statistics of country and firm-level variables are shown in Table 2.  As the statistics in 
Table 2 show, our sample is comprised of large firms; the average number of analysts covering our firms 
is 16.6.  Many of our firms generate a large portion of their sales in foreign markets; for the average firm, 
foreign sales represent 31.4% of total sales.  As a proportion of assets, proceeds raised in domestic 
(foreign) markets comprise about 0.5 (0.3) percent for the average firm in our sample.  The statistics in 
Table 2 show that the majority of foreign equity issues take place outside of the US, or in Europe.  As 
mentioned earlier, SDC does not provide the actual country in which the foreign issue takes place, but 
rather codes the market of issue as either “US Public” or “Europe Public.” 
4. Main Results 
i. Proceeds from domestic and foreign equity issues 
As a first test of our hypotheses, we will examine whether the total proceeds raised from equity issues 
has changed significantly after the adoption of IFRS.  Per our first two hypotheses, the improvements in 
disclosure and information quality brought about by the adoption of IFRS should lead to a decline in the 
cost of raising equity and lead to a substantial increase in domestic and foreign equity issues post-IFRS.  
To examine this, we first use the following regression model: 
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                                      (1) 
Yit is the total proceeds raised by firm i in year t as a proportion of total assets; IFRS is an indicator 
variable equal to one after the year of IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise;
12
 Xit-1 is a vector of firm level 
controls that have been shown to affect a firm’s decision to issue equity or that affect a firm’s capital 
structure.  These variables are one-year lagged and include the log of total assets to capture firm size; a 
proxy for leverage (total debt-to-total assets); the return on equity, ROE (net income divided by total 
common equity) as a measure of profitability; the market value-to-book value ratio; the percentage of 
shares that are closely-held, as a proxy for ownership structure; an indicator variable that equals one if the 
firm has shares cross-listed in the US markets and 0 otherwise- ADR; the proportion of foreign sales; 
capital expenditure (capital expenditure divided by total assets); a firm’s need for external financing 
following Rajan and Zingales (1998) – capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations as a 
proportion of capital expenditures; the log of total analysts covering the firm, and an indicator variable 
that equals one if the firm follows US GAAP in a given year and 0 otherwise.  Zct is a vector of country 
level controls that includes a crisis indicator that equals one for the period 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise; the 
domestic annual stock market return – calculated from DataStream’s market index; the log of GDP per 
capita to control for financial development; a proxy for the size of the stock market- stock market 
capitalization-to-GDP; the annual growth in GDP, and a proxy for exogenous growth opportunities 
following Bekaert et al. (2007) – the inner product of the vector of global industry PE ratios and country 
specific industry weights.  We also include industry (2-digit SIC) and country fixed effects in all our 
regressions to control for time-invariant industry and country-specific factors that may affect equity 
issues.
13
  
Our first hypothesis posits that the reduction in information asymmetry brought about by the adoption 
of IFRS should lead to an increase in equity issues.  We thus expect the coefficient 1 in equation 1 to be 
positive and significant; this would indicate that the proceeds raised by the average firm in our sample 
increase significantly following the adoption of IFRS.  The results are shown in Panel A of Table 3.  In 
Panel A we present results from total proceeds raised as well as for proceeds raised from primary shares.  
The first column shows results for total proceeds-scaled by total assets- raised; columns 2 and 3 show 
results for proceeds raised in foreign and domestic markets, respectively.  Columns 4-6 replicate the 
results using the total proceeds raised from the issue of primary shares. 
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We first examine whether the results shown in Panel A of Table 3 are in line with our first hypothesis.  
The coefficient on IFRS is positive and significant at the 1% level in all model specifications.  These 
results reflect a significant increase in proceeds raised from equity issues following the adoption of IFRS, 
after controlling for various factors that may affect a firm’s decision to issue equity, which adds support 
to our first hypothesis.  The results in column 1 suggest that the total proceeds (as a percent of total 
assets) raised from equity issues are 73 basis points higher following IFRS, which corresponds to a 12.2 
percent standard deviation increase.
14
  Similarly, the coefficient on IFRS in model 3 indicates that total 
equity issues raised in domestic markets are 40 basis points higher after IFRS adoption – which 
corresponds to an 8.3 percent standard deviation increase.
15
  Thus, firms significantly increase the 
proceeds raised from equity issues following IFRS adoption, consistent with the view that there is a 
decline in information asymmetry that makes it less costly for firms to issue equity.  These results are 
confirmed when we only include the proceeds raised from primary issues (models 4 and 6).
16
 
Next we examine whether the results in Panel A of Table 3 provide support for our second hypothesis 
as well.  If IFRS adoption leads to a reduction in CMLOF costs, then we expect an increase in equity 
issues in foreign markets, given that foreign firms will find it less costly to issue equity abroad.  The 
results in Panel A of Table 3 show that the proceeds raised from foreign equity issues experience a 
substantial increase following IFRS adoption.  The results are both statistically as well as economically 
significant.  Taking the coefficient on IFRS in model 2, the total proceeds raised in foreign markets (as a 
proportion of total assets) by the average firm increase by 33 basis points, which represents a 9.4 percent 
standard deviation increase.  Firms would avoid raising equity in foreign markets if the information 
asymmetry and adverse selection costs associated with issuing equity abroad exceed the benefits.  Thus, 
our results are consistent with a reduction in the costs associated with CMLOF.  The results hold for 
proceeds raised in foreign markets through primary shares (model 5).  
The results in Panel A of Table 3 also show that larger firms, with higher leverage, and higher 
profitability (lower ROE) raise less equity both domestically and abroad.  More profitable companies 
(higher ROE) should be able to use internally generated funds to finance growth opportunities; thus as the 
results show, more profitable firms have less of a need to raise external funds.  In addition, firms with 
higher market-to-book value tend to raise more equity at home and abroad.  In line with findings in prior 
studies (Reese and Weisbach, 2002), we see a significant increase in proceeds raised in foreign markets 
for firms that have shares cross-listed in the US market.  In addition, firms that adopt US GAAP tend to 
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 The standard deviation of total proceeds-to-total assets is 0.060. 
15
 The standard deviation of total proceeds raised in domestic markets-to-total assets is 0.048. 
16
 In the remainder of the paper, we preset results using total proceeds raised.  Results are similar when we restrict 
our sample to proceeds from primary shares. 
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raise more equity in foreign markets, but less equity domestically, which suggests that the adoption of US 
GAAP may facilitate foreign equity issues.  The results also show that firms in more developed countries 
with larger stock markets tend to raise more equity capital, especially at home.  Finally, domestic equity 
issues decline significantly during the recent financial crisis, and somewhat surprisingly, there are less 
domestic equity issues associated with strong local stock market performance.  The coefficient on stock 
market return is negative and highly significant.  One plausible explanation for this finding is that periods 
in which the stock market performs well are those in which the incentive for managers to issue equity to 
take advantage of an overpriced stock is the greatest; this would increase the adverse selection costs of 
doing so. 
As a test of our third hypothesis that posits that more opaque and more external finance-dependent 
firms should benefit more from the improvement in the information environment and the subsequent 
reduction in information asymmetry, we interact the IFRS indicator variable with a proxy for firm’s need 
for external finance and with two proxies for information asymmetry.  Our proxies for information 
asymmetry include an indicator variable – Size_p25- that equals one if a firm’s total assets fall in the 
bottom 25
th
 percentile of the distribution in its country and 0 otherwise, and an indicator variable- 
Analyst_p25- that equals one if the total number of analysts following a firm is in the bottom 25
th
 
percentile of the distribution in its country, and 0 otherwise.  All else equal, there should be less 
information available (thus, more information asymmetry problems) for smaller firms with lower analyst 
coverage.  The CMLOF costs will thus be higher for such firms.  We present results including these 
interactions in Panel B of Table 3.  To conserve space, we only show results using total proceeds raised.  
The results are similar (in magnitude and statistical significance) when we restrict the sample to total 
proceeds raised from primary issues. 
First, we analyze the impact of IFRS adoption on firms with a need for external finance.  
Improvements in the information environment that lower information asymmetry and the adverse 
selection costs of issuing equity should primarily benefit firms that need to access capital markets.  
Because IFRS adoption has been shown to reduce information asymmetry, but can also to improve 
comparability of financial statements across countries, which lowers the costs of gathering information on 
foreign firms for local investors, we can expect an increase in both domestic and foreign equity issues 
following IFRS adoption.  The results in Panel A of Table 3 show that firms with more need of external 
finance increase the total proceeds raised from equity issues (Model 1) following IFRS adoption, which is 
consistent with an overall reduction in information asymmetry that lowers adverse selection costs of 
raising capital in equity markets.  When we separate the proceeds raised in domestic and foreign equity 
issues, however, the results show no significant increase in proceeds raised for domestic issues (model 7), 
14 
 
but a significant increase for foreign equity issues following IFRS for firms with more need of external 
finance (model 4).  These results add additional support to the view that IFRS adoption leads to a 
reduction in CMLOF costs, which leads to an increase in foreign equity issues, especially for firms with 
more need to access capital markets.  The results are economically significant.  The results in column 4 of 
Panel B in Table 3 show that a one standard deviation increase in the need for external finance (0.118) is 
associated with an 18 basis point increase in proceeds raised in foreign markets (as a % of total assets) 
following IFRS adoption, which corresponds to a 5.0 standard deviation increase.
17
  More importantly, 
note that the coefficient on the need for external finance in column 4 is negative and significant (-0.003 
with a t-statistic of 1.79), which signifies that firms with more need of external finance raised less capital 
in foreign markets prior to IFRS adoption.  A one standard deviation increase in the need for external 
finance is associated with proceeds raised in foreign markets that are three basis points lower prior to 
IFRS adoption.  
We next examine how IFRS adoption impacts CMLOF costs, primarily for more opaque firms.  
Ceteris paribus, smaller firms and firms with lower analyst coverage may suffer the most from the 
CMLOF costs.
18
  Thus, we expect a larger increase in proceeds raised from foreign equity issues post-
IFRS for such firms.  The results in Panel B of Table 3 show results consistent with our third hypothesis.  
First, we do not observe an increase in proceeds raised from domestic equity issues for firms in the 
bottom 25
th
 percentile of size and analyst coverage.  More importantly, the results in models 5 and 6 of 
Panel B of Table 3 show a large increase in proceeds raised in foreign markets for firms with lower 
analyst coverage (those in the bottom 25
th
 percentile) and for small firms (bottom 25
th
 percentile in terms 
of total assets).  The results are economically and statistically significant.  From the coefficients in model 
5, firms that are in the bottom 25
th
 percentile of analyst coverage increase the proceeds raised in foreign 
markets by about 10 basis points (2.9 percent of the standard deviation) following IFRS adoption.
19
  
Similarly, the results in model 6 show that small firms (those in the bottom 25
th
 percentile of assets) 
increase the proceeds raised in foreign markets (as % of total assets) by 30 basis points (8.6 percent of the 
standard deviation) following IFRS.  The results in model 5 also show that firms with lower analyst 
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 From model 4, the effect of a one unit change in the need for need for external finance on the proceeds raised in 
foreign markets after IFRS adoption is 0.0149= -0.0029 (coefficient on need for external finance) + 0.0178 
(coefficient on IFRS x need for external finance).  Thus, a one standard deviation change in the need for external 
finance (0.118) is associated with a 0.0018 (0.0149x0.118) increase in the proceeds raised in foreign markets post-
IFRS. 
18
 A large multinational firm, for example, may not be as exposed to CMLOF costs when raising funds in a foreign 
market because all else equal, local investors may still be familiar with the firm (as its products may be sold locally 
as well).  In contrast, local investors may not be as familiar with a smaller firm from the same country that is also 
trying to raise funds in the host country.  CMLOF costs (e.g. unfamiliarity and information costs) are bound to be 
higher for the latter. 
19
 The sum of the coefficient on the analyst_p25 indicator (-.0013) and the IFRS x Analyst_p25 (0.0023) = 0.001. 
15 
 
coverage raised less capital in foreign markets prior to IFRS adoption.  Again, this could be a result of the 
high CMLOF costs faced by these firms prior to the adoption of IFRS.   
Overall, the results in Panels A and B of Table 3 provide some evidence consistent with our first three 
hypotheses.  One concern with the results presented thus far, however, is that we are including mandatory 
as well as voluntary IFRS adopters.  Ultimately, our goal is to measure how an exogenous shock to the 
information environment affects firms’ decision and ability to raise external capital by affecting the costs 
associated with issuing equity.  Firms may voluntarily adopt IFRS precisely because they may be in need 
of external financing.  As such, IFRS adoption may be used as a signal of their commitment to improve 
disclosure (an alternate form of bonding).  Thus, the increase in equity issues following IFRS adoption 
may arise endogenously in the results presented earlier.  To mitigate the issues associated with the 
inclusion of voluntary adopters, in Panel C of Table 3 we replicate our results from Panel B excluding 
voluntary adopters.  To conserve space, we show results from the base regressions (as in Panel A) and 
with the interactions with the small_p25 indicator variable.  All other results are similar.  The results in 
Panel C confirm our prior findings.  There is a significant increase in proceeds raised after the adoption of 
IFRS in both domestic and foreign capital markets.  The coefficient on IFRS is positive and significant at 
the 1% level in all model specifications.  The magnitude of the coefficients is similar to those reported in 
Panels A and B.  The evidence presented in Panel C continues to support our hypotheses.  In line with our 
first two hypotheses, there is a substantial increase in the proceeds raised through equity issues following 
IFRS adoption both in domestic as well as in foreign markets.  In addition, adding support to the view that 
IFRS adoption reduces CMLOF costs for more opaque firms, the results in Panel B also show larger 
increases in foreign equity issues post-IFRS for smaller firms.  Thus, in line with our third hypothesis, 
these findings suggest a decline in the information and unfamiliarity costs associated with CMLOF for 
firms whose costs are highest ex-ante.
20
  There is one result that was insignificant earlier and becomes 
statistically significant in Panel C.  Proceeds raised by small firms in domestic markets are higher by 
about 28 basis points post-IFRS.  Although the sign was the same in Panel B, the result was statistically 
insignificant. 
Thus far, we have provided some evidence of an increase in the amount of equity issues raised in 
domestic and foreign markets following IFRS.  The results are consistent with our hypotheses and with 
the view that the adoption of IFRS reduced information asymmetry and adverse selection costs associated 
with raising equity.  The significant increase in foreign equity issues suggests a reduction in costs 
                                                          
20 In unreported results, we replicate our results in Table 3 using only primary issues.  The results presented continue 
to hold.   
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associated with CMLOF.  As an alternate way to test our hypotheses, in the next section we turn to 
examine whether firms are more likely to issue equity following IFRS adoption. 
ii. Changes in the Probability of Equity Issues 
If the adoption of IFRS lowers information asymmetry and adverse selection costs associated with 
raising equity, the probability of a firm issuing equity should increase post-IFRS, ceteris paribus.  To 
explore whether IFRS adoption leads to an increase in the probability of a firm issuing equity, we will 
estimate Probit regressions as follows: 
                                              (2) 
Equity issueit is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i issues equity in year t and 0 otherwise.  We 
also break down the equity issue indicator into two separate indicators for firms issuing equity at home 
and those issuing equity in foreign markets.  IFRS is an indicator variable equal to one starting the year 
after IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise.  Xit is a vector of firm level controls that may affect the firm’s 
probability of equity issuance.  These variables are the same ones used in equation 1 and described in 
Appendix A.  These include the log of total assets; leverage; ROE; the market value-to-book value ratio; 
the percentage of shares that are closely-held; an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has shares 
cross-listed in the US markets and 0 otherwise; the proportion of foreign sales; capital expenditure-to-
total assets; the need for external financing following Rajan and Zingales (1998); the log of total analysts 
covering the firm, and an indicator variable that equals one if the firm follows US GAAP in a given year 
and 0 otherwise.  Zct is a vector of country variables that includes the stock market return in country c; the 
log of GDP per capita; the stock market capitalization; GDP growth; a proxy for exogenous growth 
opportunities (Bekaert et al. 2007), and an indicator of the recent global financial crisis.  In addition, all 
regressions include industry (2-digit SIC) and country fixed effects to capture other time invariant factors 
that may affect a firm’s decision to issue equity.  Our primary variable of interest for our first two 
hypotheses is the coefficient on 1.  The hypotheses predict a positive coefficient on 1, suggesting an 
increase in the probability of a firm issuing equity following IFRS adoption. 
The results from Probit regressions are shown in Table 4.  In all models we report marginal effects at 
the average value of the independent variables.  For binary variables, the marginal effects are calculated 
as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the indicator variable changes 
from 0 to 1.  In Panel A we present results using the base case specification (with no interaction terms) as 
a test of our first two hypotheses.  We present results for both voluntary and mandatory adopters (models 
1-3) as well as for mandatory adopters only (models 4-6).  The results in Panel A document a significant 
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increase in the probability of a firm issuing equity following IFRS adoption.  Examining the results in 
model 1, the coefficient on IFRS indicates that the probability of issuing equity increases by 1.84 percent 
following IFRS adoption.  This constitutes an economically significant increase, relative to the average 
probability of issuing equity (5.22%).  A similar result obtains for domestic equity issues (model 3).  The 
coefficient on IFRS in model 3 indicates a 0.57 percent higher probability of raising equity in domestic 
markets following IFRS adoption; this is an economically large result, given the average probability of 
issuing equity domestically (3.75%).  The results are thus consistent with our first hypothesis.  When we 
exclude voluntary adopters, the results for total equity issues continue to hold, as can be seen by the IFRS 
coefficient in model 4 (.0147 with a t-statistic of 4.14).  There is no significant increase in domestic 
equity issues once we exclude voluntary adopters, however. 
Our second hypothesis predicts an increase in the probability of issuing equity in foreign markets 
following IFRS adoption as a result of a decrease in informational costs associated with CMLOF.  The 
results in Panel A of Table 4 provide support for this hypothesis as well.  Taking the coefficient on IFRS 
in column 2 (0.0034 with a t-statistic of 1.94), the results show a 0.34 percent higher probability of 
issuing equity in foreign markets following IFRS adoption.  This constitutes an economically large 
increase, considering the average probability of issuing equity in foreign markets is 2.46%.  We note that 
this result may be driven by voluntary IFRS adopters.  The result is no longer statistically significant once 
we exclude voluntary adopters (model 5).  So, at least for the average firm in our sample, voluntary 
adoption of IFRS may yield more of a reduction in CMLOF costs.  We later examine whether those firms 
with higher ex-ante CMLOF costs benefit from both mandatory and voluntary IFRS adoption. 
The results in Panel A of Table 4 also show that larger firms, with higher leverage, lower 
profitability, higher market-to-book ratios, and those that cross-list in the US are more likely to issue 
equity at home and abroad.  In addition, firms that adopt US GAAP have a higher probability of issuing 
equity in foreign markets.  The country level variables show a lower probability of issuing equity 
domestically, but a higher probability of issuing equity in foreign market during the recent financial crisis.   
Finally, firms in more developed countries with larger stock markets are more likely to issue equity, while 
those in countries with high stock market returns, higher GDP growth, and more exogenous growth 
opportunities are less likely to issue equity, especially domestically.  The results hold for both mandatory 
and voluntary IFRS adopters as well as for mandatory adopters only. 
Next, we examine the predictions of our third hypothesis using interactions of the IFRS indicator 
variable and proxies for a firm’s external financing need and for information asymmetry (Analyst_p25, 
and Size_p25), as before.  Firms that stand to gain the most from a reduction in costs of CMLOF are 
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those in need to raise external capital, as well as those with higher ex-ante information asymmetry.  If 
IFRS adoption decreases CMLOF costs, an increase in the probability of foreign equity issues should be 
stronger for such firms.  The results corroborate the predictions of our third hypothesis.  In Panel B of 
Table 4 we present results using these interactions for both mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters.  We 
replicate the results excluding voluntary adopters in Panel C.  Examining the results in model 4 of Panel 
B, the results show a significant increase in the probability of issuing equity in foreign markets following 
IFRS for firms with more need of external finance.  However, there is no increase in the probability of 
issuing equity in domestic markets following IFRS for firms with higher need for external finance (model 
7).  The results also show that smaller firms and those with lower analyst coverage experience a 
significant increase in the probability of issuing equity in foreign markets post-IFRS, which support the 
view that IFRS adoption reduced the costs of CMLOF.  The results also show that smaller firms and those 
with lower analyst coverage have a lower probability of issuing equity in foreign markets prior to IFRS 
adoption.  The coefficient on Analyst_p25 in model 5 (-0.0109 with t-statistic of 4.45) indicates a 1.09 
percent lower probability of a foreign equity issue prior to IFRS adoption for firms in the bottom 25
th
 
percentile of analyst coverage in their country.  The result is economically large, when compared to the 
average probability of issuing equity in foreign markets (2.46%).  Similarly, the results in model 6 show 
that prior to IFRS adoption, small firms (those in the bottom 25
th
 percentile in terms of total assets) have a 
0.67% lower probability of issuing equity in foreign markets.  These results add support to the view that 
CMLOF costs were excessively high for smaller firms with lower analyst coverage, which prevented 
them from tapping into foreign capital markets.  However, IFRS adoption lowered such costs, and as 
such, the probability of raising equity capital in foreign markets increased for these firms following IFRS 
adoption.  
As a robustness test, in Panel C of Table 4 we replicate the results in Panel B, excluding voluntary 
adopters, which may have other motives for adopting IFRS that may affect their decision to issue equity.  
Overall, the results in Panel C confirm our findings in Panel B.  The results in Panel C continue to show 
that firms with more need to access capital markets, smaller firms, and those with lower analyst coverage 
have a higher probability of issuing equity in foreign markets subsequent to the mandatory IFRS adoption 
in their home country.  The magnitude of the coefficients are similar (and in many cases larger) than those 
in Panel B, suggesting a stronger effect for such firms when IFRS is adopted in their countries.  These 
results suggest that IFRS adoption leads to a reduction in CMLOF costs that makes it possible for such 
firms to tap into global capital markets. 
We have thus far presented evidence that shows an increase in proceeds raised through equity issues 
and in the probability of issuing equity in both domestic and foreign markets following the adoption of 
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IFRS, which is consistent with our hypotheses.  In addition, the evidence shows that foreign equity issues 
(and the probability of raising equity in foreign markets) increase following IFRS adoption, especially for 
firms in need of external finance, and those with more ex-ante information asymmetry (smaller firms and 
those with lower analyst coverage).  Thus, the evidence points to a significant reduction in the adverse 
selection costs and other information costs of CMLOF, which allows firms to more easily raise capital in 
foreign markets.  Ideally, to more directly test whether the costs associated with CMLOF have decreased, 
we would need a direct measure of these costs.
21
  Lack of data availability prevents us from exploring 
such an avenue in this paper.  However, in the next section, we examine our fourth hypothesis by 
examining the stock price reaction to seasoned equity offerings following IFRS adoption.  While not 
perfect, this provides a more direct way of examining the costs (i.e. the negative price reaction to SEO 
announcements) associated with CMLOF. 
iii. Stock price reaction to SEO announcements 
We now turn to test our fourth hypothesis.  It has been widely documented that because of the 
information asymmetry problems (i.e. manager may issue equity when the company’s stock price is 
overvalued) the market tends to respond adversely to the announcement of equity issues (see, e.g. Eckbo 
and Masulis, 1995).  These adverse selection costs should be more pronounced when firms issue equity 
abroad.  Thus, improvements in the information environment could lead to a less adverse response to 
equity issues, especially for firms seeking to raise equity in foreign markets, where investors are less 
familiar with the firm.  To test this prediction, we first compute cumulative abnormal returns for firms in 
our sample around the filing date of the equity issue.
22
  The advantage of testing the stock market’s 
reaction to equity issues is that we can obtain a measure of the adverse selection costs (i.e. the adverse 
reaction can be interpreted as a proxy for the cost of raising equity).  One disadvantage, however, is a 
large reduction in sample size.  Because we need stock price data available for each firm, our sample size 
drops to 1,724 firm-year observations in this analysis.  As such, the results in this section should be 
interpreted with the caveat that the results may not be representative of all seasoned equity offers during 
our sample period.   
Many of the equity issues in our sample are global issues in which the firm raises equity 
simultaneously at home and abroad.  Given our interest in identifying the market’s reaction to foreign 
equity issues, we face a problem when analyzing stock price reaction to global issues, given that we 
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 For example, a comparison of foreign versus domestic equity issues in a home market before and after IFRS 
adoption in the foreign firm’s home country. 
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  We compute CARs around the filing date following Ferreira and Laux (2009) who show that the filing date for 
SEOs corresponds to the announcement date in the majority of cases in their broad sample of SEOs. 
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cannot determine whether the reaction was a result of the foreign or the domestic issue.  To address this, 
we first classify global issues as “foreign” if the proceeds raised in foreign markets exceed the proceeds 
raised in the home market for a particular issue.  Similarly, a global issue is classified as “domestic” if the 
majority of the proceeds from the issue are raised in the home market.  In some robustness tests 
(unreported), we exclude global issues from our classification of foreign issues and obtain similar 
results.
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We obtain abnormal returns from the following market model: 
                                (3)  
Rit refers to the daily stock return for firm i on day t; Rct is the daily return on DataStream’s value-
weighted market index for country c, and it is the daily excess return for firm i.  We then compute 
cumulative abnormal returns from day t-2 to day t+2 as well as buy and hold cumulative abnormal returns 
(BHCAR) around the SEO filing date as follows: 
      
      
∏        
    
    
   
 To examine our last hypothesis, we run regressions similar to those in equation 3, but using the 
CARs as the dependent variable.   
                                                            (5) 
CARit is the cumulative abnormal return (buy-and hold abnormal returns) for firm i from t=-2 to t=+2 
around the SEO filing date.  IFRS is an indicator variable equal to one after the year of adoption of IFRS 
and 0 otherwise; Foreign is an indicator that equals one if the equity was issued in foreign markets and 0 
otherwise.  As before, Xit is a vector of firm level controls, and Zct is a vector of country level variables.  
All firm and country level controls are the same ones used in Tables 3 and 4 and are defined in Appendix 
A.  We also include industry (2-digit SIC codes) and country fixed effects in all regressions to control for 
other time invariant country and industry factors that may affect CARs, and include a control to capture 
the time trend in CARs.  Per our fourth hypothesis, the variable of interest is 3 and we expect 3 to be 
positive and significant if IFRS adoption leads to a reduction in CMLOF costs.  This would indicate a 
more positive (or less negative) response to the announcement of a foreign equity issue following IFRS.   
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The results from the above regressions are presented in Table 5.  Consistent with the predictions 
of our fourth hypothesis, the results indicate a less adverse response to equity issues in foreign markets 
following IFRS adoption.  First, for domestic issues, the reaction is negative but insignificant following 
IFRS adoption; the coefficient of IFRS in model 1 shows that CARs are 1.59% lower for domestic issues 
following IFRS adoption.  In addition, the results show a negative, but insignificant reaction to foreign 
equity issues prior to IFRS adoption.  Taking the coefficient on the “Foreign” indicator in model 1, CARs 
are 1.48% lower (although statistically insignificant) for foreign equity issues prior to IFRS adoption.  
More importantly, the results show that foreign equity issues have higher CARs following IFRS adoption.  
The results in model 1 show that foreign equity issues have CARs that are 1.02% higher following IFRS 
adoption, representing 8.8 percent of the standard deviation of CARs.
24
  Similar results hold if we use 
BHCARs as the dependent variable (model 2).  BHCARs for foreign issues are 0.81% higher pots-IFRS 
(or 8.4 percent of its standard deviation).  This is consistent with a significant reduction in the CMLOF 
costs associated with equity issuances in foreign markets.   
Overall, the results presented in Table 5 add some additional support to the view that information 
costs of CMLOF decrease following IFRS adoption.  We should expect large adverse reactions to the 
announcement of foreign issues when CMLOF costs are high.  These would drive down the CARs 
observed around the announcement.  If IFRS adoption did not have any impact on costs of CMLOF, we 
should not observe any significant impact following IFRS for foreign issues.  While we acknowledge that 
the results in this section are for a small subset of the equity issues in our sample, the results continue to 
support prior findings and the view that IFRS adoption leads to a reduction in costs associated with 
CMLOF.  
Having presented evidence supporting our four hypotheses, we not turn to examine the robustness of 
our results.  We will present the results of some robustness tests in tables and discuss other robustness 
tests whose results were untabulated. 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
One potential issue with the results presented thus far deals with the changing composition of the 
firms in our sample.  During our sample period, DataStream and WolrdScope coverage improved 
drastically, especially for emerging markets.  Thus, it is possible that our results may be driven by new 
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(standard deviation) is -.011 (0.097). 
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firms that are added to our sample in the post-IFRS period, if such firms are more likely to issue equity.  
If this is the case, it is the composition of the firms in our sample, and not the improvement in information 
environment that drive our results.  To examine this valid possibility, we perform our analyses by 
restricting our sample to firms that exist and have data available for at least three years before and three 
years after the adoption of IFRS in their respective countries.  This ensures a consistent sample before and 
after IFRS.  Not surprisingly, our sample size drops significantly from 41,599 firm-year observations in 
Table 3 to 9,762.  In Table 6, we replicate some results from Panel A of Table 3 using this subset of 
firms.  The results in Table 6 show that our main results continue to hold.  The IFRS coefficient is 
statistically significant in all model specifications, consistent with our prior findings that proceeds raised 
through equity issues increase significantly post-IFRS.  Importantly, the IFRS coefficient in model 2 
(0.0042 with a t-statistic of 2.34) shows a significant increase in proceeds raised in foreign markets 
following IFRS.  In addition, the coefficient is larger than the one in Table 3 (model 2), suggesting that 
the magnitude of the results is stronger for this subset of firms.  These results corroborate our earlier 
findings and add support to our first two hypotheses.  IFRS adoption leads to an increase in subsequent 
equity issues, suggesting a reduction in the adverse selection costs associated with issuing equity at home 
and abroad (CMLOF).   
Prior studies have shown that many of the benefits associated with IFRS adoption accrue to firms 
within the European Union (Daske et al.2008).  To examine whether the increase in equity issues accrues 
to firms within the European Union, Table 7 presents results of regressions of total proceeds as a percent 
of assets, similar to Table 3, including indicator variables for European Union countries.  Model 1 shows 
results for total issues; model 2 shows results for foreign issues, and model 3 shows results for domestic 
equity issues.  The results in Panel 7 suggest that the reduction in information asymmetry and adverse 
selection costs of issuing equity accrues to firms outside the European Union as well.  The coefficient of 
IFRS in model 2 (0.0018 with a t-statistic of 2.68) shows that firms outside of the European Union 
experience an 18 basis point increase in proceeds raised in foreign markets (as a % of total assets) 
following IFRS adoption.  Firms in the European Union experience a smaller (9 basis points) increase in 
proceeds raised in foreign markets following IFRS adoption.  Similar results obtain for total equity issues; 
however, while non-EU firms experience a significant increase in total proceeds raised at home post-
IFRS, the increase is not statistically significant for EU firms.  
In additional robustness tests (unreported), we use alternate proxies for the need of external finance to 
examine whether such firms experience an increase in foreign equity issues abroad.  In particular, we use 
the financing deficit following Frank and Goyal (2003) - the sum of cash dividends, investments, and net 
changes in working capital, less internal cash flows, scaled by total assets.  Using this alternate measure, 
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we confirm our earlier findings.  Firms with larger financing deficits experience a more significant 
increase in proceeds raised in foreign equity issues following IFRS adoption.  In addition, the probability 
of a foreign equity issue is significantly higher for such firms post-IFRS adoption.  These results are in 
line with the view that IFRS adoption leads to a decrease in costs associated with CMLOF.   
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine how changes in the information environment affect the adverse 
selection costs associated with raising equity capital.  In particular, we examine how a decrease in 
information asymmetry and improvements in comparability and accessibility of financial information 
across countries around the introduction of IFRS affects the costs associated with issuing equity in foreign 
markets, or the capital market liability of foreignness (CMLOF).   
Using a sample of 41,599 firm-year observations from 28 countries that have adopted IFRS or 
plan to adopt IFRS and allow firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS, we test 
four hypotheses based on the reduction in information asymmetry around IFRS adoption.  First we posit 
that the adoption of IFRS should lead to an increase in proceeds raised from equity issues.  Second, we 
conjecture that IFRS adoption increases a firm’s probability of issuing equity in foreign markets because 
the improved information environment reduces the costs of CMLOF.  Third, we posit that the increase in 
equity issuances in foreign markets should be stronger for more opaque and more financially constrained 
firms.  Such firms face higher CMLOF costs ex-ante and thus should benefit more from a decline in such 
costs.  Finally, we postulate that the adverse reaction to the announcement of foreign equity issues should 
be lessened following IFRS adoption as a result of the reduction in costs associated with CMLOF; 
mainly, informational costs. 
We find support for our four hypotheses.  We document an increase in equity issues domestically 
and in foreign markets, in line with our first two hypotheses.  In addition, we find evidence of an increase 
in the probability of equity issues following IFRS adoption.  This result holds both for domestic and 
foreign equity issues.  Third, we present evidence documenting a more significant increase in the 
probability of issuing equity and in the amount equity raised in foreign markets for firms with more need 
of external finance, and for firms with higher information asymmetry (smaller firms and firms with lower 
analyst coverage).  These findings support our third hypothesis and provide more direct evidence of a 
reduction in information costs associated with CMLOF for firms with higher ex-ante CMLOF costs.  
Finally, we show a significant reduction in the adverse stock price reaction to foreign equity issue 
announcements following IFRS.  Average CARs around foreign SEOs are about 1 percent higher (or less 
negative) following IFRS. 
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Overall, our results present evidence in line with significant reductions in the costs associated 
with CMLOF.  Following IFRS, such costs appear to have declined significantly, making it easier (and 
arguably, less costly) for firms to access foreign capital markets.  While we document indirect evidence of 
a reduction in CMLOF costs, the literature would benefit from future research that attempts to measure 
these costs more directly.  Such an approach, while unattainable in this study given data limitations, 
would add to this literature by quantifying the magnitude of CMLOF costs and by more directly 
documenting the size of the implied reduction in such costs following IFRS adoption that is documented 
in this study. 
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Table 1. Equity issues by country 
The sample is comprised of firms from countries that adopted IFRS, or have committed to adopt IFRS and allow firms to report 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS. The table reports the total proceeds (in million US$, 2010 prices) raised by firms 
of a given country over the period 1991-2010.  The number of domestic issues represents the fraction of shares issued in the 
domestic market, while the number of foreign issues represents the fraction of shares raised in foreign markets. 
 
   Total Issues  Foreign Issues  Domestic Issues 
Country 
Mandatory 
IFRS year Nobs Nissues 
Proceeds 
(US $M)  Nissues 
Proceeds 
(US $M)  Nissues 
Proceeds 
(US $M) 
Australia      2005 3,931 288 56,681  147 19,156  174 37,525 
Austria        2005 323 20 7,758  15 6,129  13 1,629 
Belgium        2005 660 22 5,970  15 2,042  14 3,928 
Brazil         2010 140 20 9,794  10 4,135  15 5,659 
Denmark        2005 986 42 16,002  20 12,022  30 3,980 
Finland        2005 1,058 32 6,209  13 2,413  25 3,795 
France         2005 4,416 142 91,100  77 54,624  108 36,476 
Germany        2005 3,740 143 83,582  67 37,056  105 46,527 
Greece         2005 321 13 7,201  9 4,602  10 2,599 
Hungary        2005 114 5 1,045  4 972  2 73 
India           922 66 12,753  52 11,322  16 1,431 
Ireland        2005 395 18 1,337  12 873  13 464 
Israel         2008 163 13 2,987  6 583  10 2,404 
Italy          2005 1,549 46 27,691  20 7,318  38 20,374 
Mexico         2012 80 5 903  4 740  3 163 
Netherlands    2005 1,435 84 35,189  55 26,821  61 8,368 
Norway         2005 1,110 88 19,434  47 10,407  63 9,027 
Philippines    2005 279 7 678  5 658  3 19 
Poland         2005 122 10 514  1 54  9 460 
Portugal       2005 361 14 5,442  7 2,292  12 3,151 
South Africa   2005 1,605 37 16,514  20 9,653  23 6,861 
Spain          2005 1,078 46 15,436  24 5,007  37 10,429 
Sweden         2005 1,338 69 12,201  34 5,048  53 7,153 
Switzerland    2005 1,561 48 11,702  28 6,619  38 5,083 
Thailand       2011 1,314 22 3,282  11 1,821  16 1,461 
Turkey         2006 76 1 75  0 0  1 75 
United Kingdom 2005 12,512 864 104,145  316 48,493  655 55,652 
Venezuela      2005 10 0 0  0 0  0 0 
Total  41,599 2,165 555,623  1,019 280,858  1,547 274,765 
           
Before IFRS  24,724 839 254,613  437 155,001  699 99,612 
After IFRS  16,875 1,326 301,011  582 125,857  848 175,153 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
The sample is comprised of firms from countries that adopted IFRS, or have committed to adopt IFRS and allow firms to 
report financial statements in accordance with IFRS. The time period ranges from 1991 to 2010. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Total Proceeds (domestic) 41,599 6.605 0.000 127.774 
Total Proceeds (foreign) 41,599 6.752 0.000 104.742 
Total Proceeds (foreign Non-U.S.) 41,599 6.384 0.000 98.936 
Total Proceeds (total) 41,599 13.357 0.000 190.762 
Proceeds/ Total assets (domestic) 41,599 0.005 0.000 0.048 
Proceeds/ Total assets (foreign) 41,599 0.003 0.000 0.035 
Proceeds/ Total assets 
(foreign Non-U.S.) 41,599 0.003 0.000 0.034 
Proceeds/ Total assets (total) 41,599 0.008 0.000 0.060 
Total Assets (log) 41,599 12.935 12.756 1.734 
Leverage 41,599 0.218 0.202 0.166 
ROE 41,599 0.075 0.113 0.313 
MTB 41,599 2.694 1.830 3.489 
Total Analysts 41,599 16.579 10.000 18.293 
Closely Held 41,599 0.415 0.421 0.253 
Foreign Sales 41,599 0.314 0.213 0.329 
Capex 41,599 0.063 0.045 0.060 
Need Ext. Finance. 41,599 -0.011 -0.005 0.118 
Market return (domestic) 41,599 0.143 0.166 0.296 
Smkt Cap. 41,599 0.994 0.895 0.559 
GDP per capita 41,599 22,905.640 23,365.890 10,074.000 
GDP growth 41,599 2.138 2.461 2.415 
GGO 41,599 2.97981 2.958547 0.261 
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Table 3. Regressions of total proceeds 
The sample is comprised of firms from countries that adopted IFRS, or have committed to adopt IFRS and allow firms to report financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS.  The time period ranges from 1991 to 2010. The dependent variable is the total proceeds by firm-
year divided by total assets.  The proceeds from domestic issues are computed using the fraction of shares issued in the domestic market, 
while those from foreign issues use the fraction of shares issued in a foreign market.  In Panel A, we present results for the total proceeds 
raised, as well as the fraction of proceeds related to the issue of primary shares of both mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters.  IFRS 
equals 1 for years after the adoption (either mandatory or voluntary) of IFRS by a given firm.  In Panel B we present results for voluntary 
and mandatory IFRS adopters with interaction of IFRS and various firm-level characteristics: 1) need for external finance; 2) low analyst 
coverage- Analyst_p25, and 3) small firms- Small_p25.  Panel C shows results excluding voluntary IFRS adopters. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The independent variables are lagged one year (except for the country-specific variables).  All regressions 
include industry (2-digit SIC) and country fixed-effects. White-robust t-stats are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Both mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters 
Dependent variable: Total Proceeds (% of assets) Total Proceeds from primary shares (% of assets)  
 Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IFRS 0.0073*** 0.0033*** 0.0040*** 0.0047*** 0.0026*** 0.0020*** 
 (8.03) (5.73) (5.84) (6.23) (5.67) (3.49) 
Log total assets -0.0022*** -0.0007*** -0.0015*** -0.0022*** -0.0007*** -0.0015*** 
 (-6.85) (-3.53) (-6.03) (-7.71) (-3.59) (-7.28) 
Leverage -0.0095*** -0.0023* -0.0072*** -0.0051*** -0.0005 -0.0046*** 
 (-4.36) (-1.92) (-4.09) (-2.69) (-0.48) (-3.01) 
ROE -0.0116*** -0.0031*** -0.0084*** -0.0122*** -0.0039*** -0.0083*** 
 (-6.93) (-2.91) (-6.74) (-7.99) (-3.93) (-7.17) 
MTB 0.0011*** 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0002*** 0.0005*** 
 (5.98) (3.69) (5.58) (5.51) (3.21) (4.99) 
Closely held 0.0026* 0.0002 0.0024** -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0002 
 (1.83) (0.28) (2.01) (-0.80) (-1.21) (-0.17) 
Foreign sales 0.0018 0.0001 0.0018 0.0015 -0.0002 0.0017* 
 (1.29) (0.09) (1.56) (1.32) (-0.25) (1.80) 
ADR 0.0065*** 0.0041*** 0.0024* 0.0029** 0.0016* 0.0013 
 (3.48) (3.38) (1.76) (2.07) (1.78) (1.20) 
Capex 0.0054 0.0075 -0.0021 0.0074 0.0072 0.0002 
 (0.81) (1.53) (-0.47) (1.21) (1.53) (0.06) 
Need ext. fin. 0.0180*** 0.0073** 0.0107** 0.0198*** 0.0083** 0.0115*** 
 (3.23) (2.13) (2.44) (4.48) (2.53) (3.84) 
Log total analysts 0.0008** 0.0007*** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004** -0.0002 
 (2.32) (2.94) (0.58) (0.82) (2.32) (-1.04) 
USGAAP 0.0032 0.0051** -0.0020* 0.0012 0.0019* -0.0006 
 (1.25) (2.36) (-1.91) (0.83) (1.82) (-0.71) 
Crisis -0.0025* 0.0014 -0.0039*** -0.0000 0.0016** -0.0017* 
 (-1.73) (1.51) (-3.58) (-0.03) (2.04) (-1.87) 
Market return -0.0027** -0.0001 -0.0026*** -0.0025*** 0.0000 -0.0025*** 
 (-2.42) (-0.09) (-3.00) (-2.73) (0.04) (-3.23) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0108*** 0.0048*** 0.0060*** 0.0095*** 0.0035*** 0.0060*** 
 (5.31) (3.15) (4.44) (5.55) (2.71) (5.24) 
Smkt Cap. 0.0027** -0.0009 0.0037*** 0.0000 -0.0014** 0.0014* 
 (2.15) (-1.20) (3.76) (0.00) (-2.45) (1.76) 
GDP growth 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.27) (1.32) (-0.88) (0.83) (0.97) (0.24) 
GGO 0.0023 0.0011 0.0013 0.0035** 0.0009 0.0025* 
 (1.22) (1.23) (0.77) (2.01) (1.18) (1.68) 
Constant -0.0905*** -0.0436*** -0.0468*** -0.0788*** -0.0294** -0.0494*** 
 (-4.33) (-2.81) (-3.38) (-4.59) (-2.24) (-4.43) 
Observations 41,599 41,599 41,599 41,599 41,599 41,599 
R-squared 0.030 0.015 0.023 0.032 0.013 0.025 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3. Regressions of Total Proceeds. Continued. 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics (Voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters) 
 Dependent variable: Total Proceeds (% of assets) 
 Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
IFRS 0.0075*** 0.0074*** 0.0068*** 0.0034*** 0.0028*** 0.0029*** 0.0041*** 0.0046*** 0.0039*** 
 (8.06) (7.83) (7.49) (5.79) (4.97) (5.26) (5.81) (6.27) (5.55) 
IFRS * Need ext. fin. 0.0259**   0.0178***   0.0081   
 (2.54)   (2.83)   (1.01)   
Analysts_p25  -0.0017   -0.0013***   -0.0004  
  (-1.28)   (-3.54)   (-0.31)  
IFRS*Analysts_p25  -0.0003   0.0023**   -0.0026*  
  (-0.16)   (2.01)   (-1.68)  
Size_p25   -0.0053***   -0.0012   -0.0041*** 
   (-3.50)   (-1.45)   (-3.41) 
IFRS*Size_p25   0.0064*   0.0042*   0.0022 
   (1.95)   (1.77)   (0.96) 
Log total assets -0.0021*** -0.0022*** -0.0024*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0017*** 
 (-6.79) (-6.66) (-6.88) (-3.47) (-3.43) (-3.51) (-5.99) (-5.86) (-6.01) 
Leverage -0.0094*** -0.0096*** -0.0094*** -0.0023* -0.0022* -0.0022* -0.0072*** -0.0073*** -0.0072*** 
 (-4.35) (-4.40) (-4.31) (-1.90) (-1.85) (-1.83) (-4.09) (-4.18) (-4.09) 
ROE -0.0116*** -0.0117*** -0.0117*** -0.0032*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0085*** -0.0085*** -0.0086*** 
 (-6.95) (-6.98) (-7.02) (-2.93) (-2.93) (-2.89) (-6.75) (-6.79) (-6.88) 
MTB 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
 (5.97) (5.96) (5.99) (3.68) (3.68) (3.69) (5.58) (5.56) (5.60) 
Closely held 0.0027* 0.0027* 0.0025* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0024** 0.0024** 0.0022* 
 (1.87) (1.86) (1.72) (0.32) (0.34) (0.30) (2.03) (2.01) (1.86) 
Foreign sales 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 
 (1.33) (1.32) (1.28) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (1.58) (1.63) (1.56) 
ADR 0.0065*** 0.0067*** 0.0068*** 0.0041*** 0.0043*** 0.0041*** 0.0024* 0.0024* 0.0026* 
 (3.47) (3.56) (3.59) (3.36) (3.46) (3.34) (1.75) (1.79) (1.94) 
Capex 0.0064 0.0052 0.0052 0.0082* 0.0073 0.0078 -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0025 
 (0.97) (0.78) (0.79) (1.69) (1.50) (1.60) (-0.40) (-0.48) (-0.56) 
Need ext. fin. 0.0032 0.0180*** 0.0178*** -0.0029* 0.0073** 0.0070** 0.0061* 0.0107** 0.0108** 
 (0.88) (3.23) (3.24) (-1.79) (2.12) (2.11) (1.92) (2.45) (2.46) 
Log total analysts 0.0008** 0.0004 0.0007** 0.0006*** 0.0006* 0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
 (2.27) (0.75) (2.19) (2.89) (1.90) (2.88) (0.55) (-0.56) (0.45) 
USGAAP 0.0034 0.0032 0.0034 0.0053** 0.0050** 0.0052** -0.0019* -0.0018* -0.0019* 
 (1.33) (1.25) (1.33) (2.43) (2.29) (2.41) (-1.85) (-1.78) (-1.82) 
Crisis -0.0025* -0.0025* -0.0024* 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0039*** -0.0039*** -0.0039*** 
 (-1.75) (-1.74) (-1.70) (1.50) (1.47) (1.54) (-3.59) (-3.54) (-3.58) 
Market return -0.0026** -0.0027** -0.0027** -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0027*** 
 (-2.37) (-2.46) (-2.46) (-0.04) (-0.16) (-0.08) (-2.98) (-3.03) (-3.06) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0112*** 0.0109*** 0.0108*** 0.0050*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0060*** 
 (5.43) (5.33) (5.30) (3.27) (3.20) (3.17) (4.50) (4.42) (4.40) 
Stock market cap. 0.0028** 0.0028** 0.0028** -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 
 (2.22) (2.18) (2.21) (-1.14) (-1.16) (-1.11) (3.79) (3.80) (3.77) 
GDP growth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.26) (0.22) (0.23) (1.31) (1.22) (1.30) (-0.89) (-0.84) (-0.93) 
GGO 0.0021 0.0024 0.0024 0.0009 0.0011 0.0010 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 
 (1.12) (1.25) (1.23) (1.08) (1.26) (1.17) (0.73) (0.78) (0.81) 
Constant -0.0947*** -0.0907*** -0.0880*** -0.0466*** -0.0442*** -0.0444*** -0.0482*** -0.0465*** -0.0436*** 
 (-4.48) (-4.33) (-4.19) (-2.95) (-2.83) (-2.84) (-3.46) (-3.36) (-3.14) 
Observations 41,599 41,599 41,599 41,599 41,599 41,599 41,599 41,599 41,599 
R-squared 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3. Regressions of Total Proceeds. Continued. 
 
Panel C: Mandatory IFRS adopters (excluding voluntary adopters) 
 Dependent variable: Total Proceeds (% of assets) 
 Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IFRS 0.0084*** 0.0071*** 0.0034*** 0.0027*** 0.0049*** 0.0043*** 
 (6.58) (5.60) (4.35) (3.58) (4.99) (4.37) 
Size_p25  -0.0063***  -0.0014  -0.0049*** 
  (-3.79)  (-1.52)  (-3.70) 
IFRS*Size_p25  0.0174***  0.0097**  0.0077* 
  (2.99)  (2.21)  (1.94) 
Log total assets -0.0027*** -0.0028*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0019*** -0.0020*** 
 (-6.94) (-6.74) (-3.46) (-3.31) (-6.17) (-5.96) 
Leverage -0.0091*** -0.0087*** -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0071*** -0.0069*** 
 (-3.70) (-3.54) (-1.48) (-1.30) (-3.54) (-3.46) 
ROE -0.0134*** -0.0133*** -0.0037*** -0.0035*** -0.0097*** -0.0098*** 
 (-7.20) (-7.21) (-3.08) (-3.01) (-6.93) (-6.99) 
MTB 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
 (5.60) (5.59) (3.45) (3.42) (5.27) (5.27) 
Closely held 0.0024 0.0022 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0030** 0.0028** 
 (1.44) (1.31) (-0.69) (-0.72) (2.13) (1.98) 
Foreign sales 0.0028* 0.0027 0.0006 0.0005 0.0022* 0.0022 
 (1.66) (1.61) (0.57) (0.52) (1.66) (1.64) 
ADR 0.0083*** 0.0085*** 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 0.0040** 0.0042** 
 (3.59) (3.67) (2.97) (2.93) (2.31) (2.45) 
Capex 0.0058 0.0063 0.0082 0.0088* -0.0024 -0.0025 
 (0.79) (0.86) (1.52) (1.65) (-0.48) (-0.51) 
Need ext. fin. 0.0201*** 0.0190*** 0.0086** 0.0078** 0.0115** 0.0111** 
 (3.13) (3.03) (2.16) (2.08) (2.27) (2.21) 
Log total analysts 0.0008** 0.0007* 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0002 0.0002 
 (1.97) (1.84) (2.26) (2.20) (0.73) (0.61) 
USGAAP 0.0035 0.0037 0.0061** 0.0062** -0.0026** -0.0025** 
 (1.10) (1.16) (2.19) (2.22) (-2.15) (-2.05) 
Crisis -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0026** 0.0026** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** 
 (-1.14) (-1.14) (2.29) (2.29) (-3.44) (-3.43) 
Mkt return -0.0039*** -0.0040*** -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0035*** -0.0035*** 
 (-3.07) (-3.10) (-0.63) (-0.62) (-3.38) (-3.41) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 0.0046*** 0.0047*** 0.0064*** 0.0063*** 
 (4.62) (4.61) (2.65) (2.66) (3.94) (3.90) 
Smkt Cap. 0.0021 0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0013 0.0037*** 0.0038*** 
 (1.30) (1.53) (-1.52) (-1.32) (2.91) (3.04) 
GDP growth 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002* 0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.64) (0.57) (1.90) (1.86) (-0.93) (-1.00) 
GGO 0.0044** 0.0042* 0.0019* 0.0018* 0.0025 0.0025 
 (1.98) (1.89) (1.86) (1.72) (1.30) (1.28) 
Constant -0.0924*** -0.0905*** -0.0429** -0.0440** -0.0495*** -0.0465*** 
 (-3.78) (-3.68) (-2.38) (-2.43) (-3.03) (-2.82) 
Observations 35,030 35,030 35,030 35,030 35,030 35,030 
R-squared 0.033 0.034 0.016 0.017 0.025 0.025 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4. Probit regressions 
The sample is comprised of firms from countries that adopted IFRS, or have committed to adopt IFRS and allow firms to report 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS.  The time period ranges from 1991 to 2010.  The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm issued equity in a given year (in the domestic or a foreign market, as labeled) and 0 otherwise.  In 
models 1-3 of Panel A, IFRS equals 1 for years after the adoption (either mandatory or voluntary) of IFRS by a given firm.  In 
models4-6 of Panel A we exclude voluntary IFRS adopters.  In Panel B we present results for voluntary and mandatory IFRS 
adopters with interaction of IFRS and various firm-level characteristics: 1) need for external finance; 2) low analyst coverage- 
Analyst_p25, and 3) small firms- Small_p25.  In Panel C we show results excluding voluntary adopters.  All variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  The independent variables are lagged one year (except for country-specific variables).  The tables show marginal 
effects.  All regressions include industry (2-digit SIC) and country fixed-effects. White-robust t-stats (absolute value) are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters 
 Dependent variable: Equity Issueit  
 Mandatory and voluntary adopters Mandatory adopters only 
 Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IFRS 0.0184*** 0.0034* 0.0057** 0.0147*** -0.0002 0.0005 
 (6.31) (1.95) (2.38) (4.14) (-0.12) (0.16) 
Log total assets 0.0042*** 0.0030*** 0.0031*** 0.0036*** 0.0031*** 0.0025*** 
 (5.25) (5.97) (4.67) (3.98) (5.75) (3.41) 
Leverage 0.0241*** 0.0126*** 0.0113** 0.0288*** 0.0142*** 0.0144*** 
 (4.16) (3.59) (2.29) (4.56) (3.78) (2.71) 
ROE -0.0203*** -0.0055*** -0.0147*** -0.0211*** -0.0052*** -0.0157*** 
 (-7.84) (-3.25) (-6.96) (-7.63) (-2.91) (-7.09) 
MTB 0.0013*** 0.0007*** 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 
 (6.00) (6.10) (5.73) (5.27) (5.61) (4.75) 
Closely held 0.0006 0.0025 -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0019 
 (0.13) (0.97) (-0.46) (-0.03) (-0.21) (-0.50) 
Foreign sales 0.0050 0.0020 0.0033 0.0086*** 0.0039* 0.0046* 
 (1.63) (1.03) (1.26) (2.58) (1.91) (1.65) 
ADR 0.0219*** 0.0120*** 0.0159*** 0.0275*** 0.0135*** 0.0218*** 
 (4.53) (4.24) (3.95) (4.83) (4.18) (4.59) 
Capex 0.0136 0.0123 -0.0025 0.0146 0.0127 -0.0023 
 (0.89) (1.34) (-0.18) (0.92) (1.33) (-0.16) 
Need ext. fin. 0.0239*** 0.0095* 0.0164*** 0.0235*** 0.0114** 0.0141** 
 (3.25) (1.87) (2.63) (2.93) (2.13) (2.10) 
Log total analysts 0.0030*** 0.0037*** 0.0006 0.0018 0.0025*** -0.0004 
 (2.73) (5.20) (0.69) (1.43) (3.30) (-0.39) 
USGAAP 0.0110 0.0101** -0.0006 0.0178** 0.0149*** 0.0024 
 (1.50) (2.25) (-0.11) (2.01) (2.77) (0.36) 
Crisis -0.0093*** 0.0093*** -0.0222*** -0.0057 0.0161*** -0.0205*** 
 (-2.71) (3.78) (-8.20) (-1.50) (5.61) (-6.88) 
Mkt return 0.0031 -0.0008 -0.0091*** 0.0025 -0.0000 -0.0100*** 
 (0.80) (-0.36) (-2.71) (0.60) (-0.02) (-2.71) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0386*** 0.0069** 0.0427*** 0.0384*** 0.0045 0.0438*** 
 (7.06) (2.20) (8.57) (6.50) (1.37) (8.25) 
Smkt Cap. 0.0432*** 0.0165*** 0.0387*** 0.0445*** 0.0189*** 0.0432*** 
 (10.30) (6.89) (10.88) (8.88) (6.86) (9.95) 
GDP growth -0.0030*** -0.0011*** -0.0031*** -0.0029*** -0.0010*** -0.0031*** 
 (-4.84) (-3.04) (-5.57) (-4.47) (-2.61) (-5.07) 
GGO -0.0338*** -0.0046 -0.0290*** -0.0364*** -0.0080** -0.0361*** 
 (-5.73) (-1.35) (-5.79) (-5.19) (-2.02) (-5.97) 
Constant 41,500 41,379 41,242 34,948 34,668 34,614 
 0.107 0.120 0.0929 0.112 0.129 0.0990 
Observations 0.0522 0.0246 0.0375 0.0539 0.0250 0.0387 
R-squared 41,500 41,379 41,242 34,948 34,668 34,614 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4. Probit regressions. Continued. 
 
Panel B: Interactions with Firm Characteristics 
 Dependent variable: Equity Issueit 
 Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
IFRS 0.0183*** 0.0203*** 0.0186*** 0.0034* 0.0018 0.0029 0.0057** 0.0071*** 0.0058** 
 (6.28) (6.64) (6.26) (1.94) (1.04) (1.64) (2.37) (2.81) (2.37) 
IFRS * Need ext. fin. 0.0082   0.0311***   0.0010   
 (0.54)   (3.21)   (0.08)   
Analysts_p25  -0.0005   -0.0109***   0.0003  
  (-0.13)   (-4.45)   (0.11)  
IFRS*Analysts_p25  -0.0085**   0.0189***   -0.0062*  
  (-2.11)   (3.88)   (-1.84)  
Size_p25   -0.0048   -0.0067*   -0.0053 
   (-0.91)   (-1.80)   (-1.34) 
IFRS*Size_p25   -0.0027   0.0147**   -0.0011 
   (-0.39)   (1.99)   (-0.20) 
Log total assets 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 0.0039*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0029*** 0.0031*** 0.0032*** 0.0028*** 
 (5.26) (5.29) (4.66) (6.07) (6.27) (5.67) (4.66) (4.68) (3.99) 
Leverage 0.0241*** 0.0235*** 0.0239*** 0.0127*** 0.0124*** 0.0127*** 0.0113** 0.0110** 0.0111** 
 (4.16) (4.05) (4.12) (3.62) (3.65) (3.64) (2.29) (2.22) (2.25) 
ROE -0.0204*** -0.0206*** -0.0207*** -0.0055*** -0.0054*** -0.0055*** -0.0148*** -0.0149*** -0.0151*** 
 (-7.85) (-7.95) (-7.97) (-3.26) (-3.30) (-3.25) (-6.95) (-7.03) (-7.12) 
MTB 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 
 (5.99) (5.98) (6.05) (6.00) (6.06) (6.11) (5.73) (5.72) (5.78) 
Closely held 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 0.0026 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0018 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (1.01) (1.01) (0.97) (-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.51) 
Foreign sales 0.0050 0.0053* 0.0050 0.0020 0.0018 0.0019 0.0033 0.0034 0.0033 
 (1.63) (1.71) (1.64) (1.05) (0.95) (1.01) (1.27) (1.33) (1.28) 
ADR 0.0219*** 0.0226*** 0.0224*** 0.0120*** 0.0123*** 0.0120*** 0.0159*** 0.0162*** 0.0164*** 
 (4.53) (4.62) (4.61) (4.22) (4.43) (4.25) (3.96) (4.00) (4.06) 
Capex 0.0137 0.0136 0.0128 0.0138 0.0110 0.0123 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0032 
 (0.90) (0.89) (0.84) (1.50) (1.24) (1.34) (-0.18) (-0.17) (-0.24) 
Need ext. fin. 0.0181 0.0243*** 0.0248*** -0.0125 0.0090* 0.0089* 0.0157 0.0167*** 0.0171*** 
 (1.37) (3.30) (3.36) (-1.53) (1.84) (1.79) (1.50) (2.67) (2.74) 
Log total analysts 0.0030*** 0.0018 0.0030*** 0.0037*** 0.0025*** 0.0036*** 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0006 
 (2.73) (1.35) (2.72) (5.17) (3.07) (5.14) (0.69) (-0.09) (0.66) 
USGAAP 0.0111 0.0117 0.0109 0.0103** 0.0091** 0.0103** -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0007 
 (1.51) (1.58) (1.49) (2.28) (2.13) (2.29) (-0.11) (-0.04) (-0.12) 
Crisis -0.0093*** -0.0093*** -0.0093*** 0.0092*** 0.0088*** 0.0093*** -0.0222*** -0.0222*** -0.0222*** 
 (-2.72) (-2.70) (-2.71) (3.74) (3.71) (3.80) (-8.21) (-8.19) (-8.20) 
Mkt return 0.0031 0.0030 0.0030 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0091*** -0.0091*** -0.0092*** 
 (0.80) (0.79) (0.78) (-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.35) (-2.71) (-2.71) (-2.73) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0388*** 0.0387*** 0.0385*** 0.0071** 0.0070** 0.0068** 0.0427*** 0.0427*** 0.0425*** 
 (7.07) (7.08) (7.04) (2.28) (2.32) (2.19) (8.57) (8.57) (8.55) 
Smkt Cap. 0.0433*** 0.0430*** 0.0430*** 0.0166*** 0.0161*** 0.0165*** 0.0388*** 0.0386*** 0.0385*** 
 (10.31) (10.25) (10.26) (6.93) (6.95) (6.93) (10.88) (10.84) (10.83) 
GDP growth -0.0030*** -0.0030*** -0.0030*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** 
 (-4.84) (-4.83) (-4.84) (-3.06) (-3.12) (-3.05) (-5.57) (-5.56) (-5.58) 
GGO -0.0339*** -0.0335*** -0.0336*** -0.0049 -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0290*** -0.0288*** -0.0289*** 
 (-5.74) (-5.68) (-5.71) (-1.44) (-1.31) (-1.39) (-5.78) (-5.76) (-5.77) 
Observations 41,500 41,500 41,500 41,379 41,379 41,379 41,242 41,242 41,242 
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.108 0.107 0.121 0.122 0.120 0.0929 0.0932 0.0931 
Actual Prob. 0.0522 0.0522 0.0522 0.0246 0.0246 0.0246 0.0375 0.0375 0.0375 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4. Probit regressions. Continued. 
 
Panel C: Interactions with Firm Characteristics – Mandatory IFRS adopters (excluding voluntary adopters) 
 Dependent variable: Equity Issueit 
 Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
IFRS 0.0146*** 0.0163*** 0.0140*** -0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0011 0.0004 0.0014 -0.0002 
 (4.09) (4.38) (3.88) (-0.17) (-1.11) (-0.52) (0.14) (0.46) (-0.08) 
IFRS * Need ext. fin. 0.0134   0.0389***   0.0041   
 (0.84)   (3.93)   (0.32)   
Analysts_p25  -0.0019   -0.0109***   -0.0014  
  (-0.51)   (-4.41)   (-0.47)  
IFRS*Analysts_p25  -0.0064   0.0217***   -0.0039  
  (-1.46)   (4.21)   (-1.07)  
Size_p25   -0.0055   -0.0065*   -0.0064 
   (-1.01)   (-1.69)   (-1.60) 
IFRS*Size_p25   0.0102   0.0280***   0.0105 
   (1.19)   (2.94)   (1.43) 
Log total assets 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0024*** 
 (4.00) (4.00) (3.78) (5.88) (6.04) (5.68) (3.41) (3.43) (3.08) 
Leverage 0.0288*** 0.0283*** 0.0290*** 0.0144*** 0.0141*** 0.0146*** 0.0144*** 0.0141*** 0.0145*** 
 (4.57) (4.48) (4.59) (3.86) (3.91) (3.92) (2.71) (2.66) (2.74) 
ROE -0.0213*** -0.0214*** -0.0212*** -0.0052*** -0.0051*** -0.0050*** -0.0158*** -0.0159*** -0.0159*** 
 (-7.66) (-7.73) (-7.63) (-2.93) (-2.91) (-2.81) (-7.10) (-7.16) (-7.14) 
MTB 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
 (5.26) (5.24) (5.26) (5.51) (5.58) (5.59) (4.74) (4.73) (4.76) 
Closely held -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0021 
 (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.05) (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.54) 
Foreign sales 0.0087*** 0.0088*** 0.0086** 0.0040* 0.0036* 0.0039* 0.0046* 0.0047* 0.0045 
 (2.59) (2.62) (2.57) (1.95) (1.79) (1.89) (1.66) (1.69) (1.64) 
ADR 0.0275*** 0.0283*** 0.0275*** 0.0134*** 0.0138*** 0.0133*** 0.0217*** 0.0223*** 0.0220*** 
 (4.82) (4.92) (4.84) (4.16) (4.36) (4.16) (4.59) (4.66) (4.64) 
Capex 0.0149 0.0145 0.0146 0.0148 0.0111 0.0131 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0025 
 (0.93) (0.90) (0.91) (1.55) (1.22) (1.39) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.18) 
Need ext. fin. 0.0145 0.0240*** 0.0230*** -0.0152* 0.0106** 0.0098* 0.0115 0.0144** 0.0137** 
 (1.08) (2.98) (2.86) (-1.87) (2.08) (1.88) (1.10) (2.14) (2.04) 
Log total analysts 0.0018 0.0005 0.0017 0.0025*** 0.0014 0.0025*** -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0004 
 (1.43) (0.34) (1.40) (3.26) (1.59) (3.26) (-0.39) (-1.01) (-0.43) 
USGAAP 0.0179** 0.0183** 0.0178** 0.0149*** 0.0136*** 0.0148*** 0.0024 0.0026 0.0023 
 (2.02) (2.06) (2.01) (2.78) (2.67) (2.78) (0.36) (0.39) (0.36) 
Crisis -0.0058 -0.0057 -0.0057 0.0159*** 0.0154*** 0.0160*** -0.0205*** -0.0205*** -0.0205*** 
 (-1.51) (-1.50) (-1.50) (5.57) (5.59) (5.63) (-6.89) (-6.88) (-6.89) 
Mkt return 0.0026 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0100*** -0.0101*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.61) (0.58) (0.60) (-0.01) (-0.04) (-0.01) (-2.70) (-2.72) (-2.72) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0386*** 0.0385*** 0.0383*** 0.0049 0.0047 0.0044 0.0439*** 0.0438*** 0.0437*** 
 (6.52) (6.53) (6.50) (1.49) (1.49) (1.37) (8.25) (8.26) (8.25) 
Smkt Cap. 0.0446*** 0.0443*** 0.0446*** 0.0190*** 0.0184*** 0.0190*** 0.0432*** 0.0431*** 0.0433*** 
 (8.90) (8.84) (8.91) (6.91) (6.96) (6.96) (9.96) (9.92) (9.98) 
GDP growth -0.0029*** -0.0029*** -0.0029*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0009*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** 
 (-4.48) (-4.46) (-4.48) (-2.63) (-2.70) (-2.62) (-5.08) (-5.07) (-5.08) 
GGO -0.0366*** -0.0360*** -0.0365*** -0.0083** -0.0078** -0.0080** -0.0361*** -0.0358*** -0.0362*** 
 (-5.22) (-5.13) (-5.21) (-2.12) (-2.06) (-2.06) (-5.98) (-5.93) (-5.99) 
Observations 34,948 34,948 34,948 34,668 34,668 34,668 34,614 34,614 34,614 
Pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.131 0.132 0.130 0.0991 0.0993 0.0993 
Actual Prob. 0.0539 0.0539 0.0539 0.0250 0.0250 0.0250 0.0387 0.0387 0.0387 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
The sample is comprised of firms from countries that adopted IFRS, or have committed to adopt IFRS and allow firms to report 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS. The time period ranges from 1991 to 2010. The dependent variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return (-2, +2) or the buy-and-hold abnormal return (-2, +2), around the filing date of the equity issue.  
IFRS equals 1 for years after the adoption (either mandatory or voluntary) and zero otherwise.  “Foreign” equals 1 if the issue is 
placed on a foreign market only or if the majority of the proceeds are raised in a foreign market, and zero otherwise. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. The independent variables are lagged one year (except for country-specific variables). All 
regressions include industry (2-digit SIC) and country fixed-effects. White-robust t-stats (absolute value) are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: CAR (-2,+2) BHCAR (-2,+2) 
 (1) (2) 
IFRS -0.0159 -0.0112 
 (-1.55) (-1.29) 
Foreign -0.0148 -0.0130 
 (-1.60) (-1.48) 
IFRS*Foreign 0.0250** 0.0211* 
 (1.98) (1.86) 
Log total assets 0.0004 0.0001 
 (0.16) (0.03) 
Leverage -0.0088 -0.0123 
 (-0.38) (-0.68) 
ROE -0.0064 -0.0052 
 (-0.58) (-0.49) 
MTB 0.0011 0.0008 
 (1.48) (1.13) 
Closely held -0.0007 0.0012 
 (-0.04) (0.10) 
Foreign sales -0.0091 0.0004 
 (-0.60) (0.04) 
ADR 0.0028 0.0026 
 (0.33) (0.32) 
Capex 0.0139 0.0510 
 (0.16) (0.97) 
Need ext. fin. -0.0160 -0.0087 
 (-0.59) (-0.37) 
Log total analysts 0.0012 -0.0002 
 (0.22) (-0.06) 
USGAAP 0.0138 0.0184 
 (1.01) (1.47) 
Time trend 0.0036 0.0019 
 (0.90) (0.70) 
Crisis -0.0433** -0.0282** 
 (-2.13) (-2.30) 
Mkt return 0.0183 0.0135 
 (1.36) (1.03) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0029 0.0096 
 (0.15) (0.51) 
Smkt Cap. -0.0254 -0.0126 
 (-1.27) (-0.91) 
GDP growth -0.0018 -0.0009 
 (-1.02) (-0.65) 
GGO -0.0162 -0.0025 
 (-0.69) (-0.11) 
Constant -0.0021 -0.1035 
 (-0.01) (-0.53) 
Observations 1,724 1,724 
R-squared 0.045 0.050 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
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Table 6. Robustness check – Regressions of total proceeds on a subsample of firms 
 
The subsample used in these regressions is a subset of the main sample that includes firms that exist at least for 3 years before 
and 3 years after the IFRS adoption (either voluntary or mandatory). The main sample is comprised of firms from countries that 
adopted IFRS, or have committed to adopt IFRS and allow firms to report financial statements in accordance with IFRS. The 
time period ranges from 1991 to 2010. The dependent variable is the total proceeds by firm-year divided by total assets. Domestic 
issues are the fraction of shares issued in the domestic market and foreign issues are the fraction of shares issued in a foreign 
market. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The independent variables are lagged one year (except for country-specific 
variables). All regressions include industry (2-digit SIC) and country fixed-effects. White-robust t-stats (absolute value) are 
shown in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: Total Proceeds (% of assets) 
 Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IFRS 0.0086*** 0.0042** 0.0085*** 
 (2.61) (2.34) (3.17) 
Log total assets -0.0017** -0.0008* -0.0009* 
 (-2.54) (-1.86) (-1.95) 
Leverage -0.0212*** -0.0049** -0.0055** 
 (-4.68) (-2.48) (-2.51) 
ROE -0.0125*** -0.0003 -0.0005 
 (-4.63) (-0.24) (-0.42) 
MTB 0.0008*** 0.0001* 0.0001* 
 (3.03) (1.75) (1.75) 
Closely held 0.0037 0.0016 0.0015 
 (1.39) (1.45) (1.46) 
Foreign sales 0.0035 0.0024 0.0027 
 (1.12) (1.12) (1.23) 
ADR 0.0098 0.0102* 0.0095 
 (1.07) (1.65) (1.55) 
Capex -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0040 
 (-0.31) (-0.71) (-0.99) 
Need ext. fin. 0.0177** 0.0039 0.0046 
 (2.16) (1.24) (1.35) 
Log total analysts 0.0005 0.0010** 0.0005 
 (0.63) (2.11) (1.05) 
USGAAP -0.0041* -0.0021** -0.0017* 
 (-1.91) (-2.11) (-1.81) 
Crisis 0.0008 0.0065 0.0067 
 (0.11) (1.21) (1.25) 
Mkt return -0.0113*** -0.0039* -0.0038* 
 (-3.19) (-1.84) (-1.81) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0368*** 0.0052 0.0053 
 (4.56) (1.07) (1.05) 
Smkt Cap. -0.0068** -0.0035* -0.0033* 
 (-2.01) (-1.81) (-1.72) 
GDP growth 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 
 (1.25) (1.28) (1.25) 
GGO 0.0042 -0.0009 -0.0014 
 (1.26) (-0.57) (-0.84) 
Constant -0.3526*** -0.0396 -0.0372 
 (-4.31) (-0.79) (-0.70) 
    
Observations 9,762 9,762 9,762 
R-squared 0.056 0.029 0.031 
IFRS 0.0086*** 0.0042** 0.0085*** 
 (2.61) (2.34) (3.17) 
Log total assets -0.0017** -0.0008* -0.0009* 
 (-2.54) (-1.86) (-1.95) 
Leverage -0.0212*** -0.0049** -0.0055** 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7. European countries and capital raising activity after IFRS 
The sample is comprised of firms from countries that adopted IFRS, or have committed to adopt IFRS and allow firms to 
report financial statements in accordance with IFRS. The time period ranges from 1991 to 2010. The dependent variable is 
the total proceeds by firm-year divided by total assets. Domestic issues are the fraction of shares issued in the domestic 
market and foreign issues are the fraction of shares issued in a foreign market. IFRS equals 1 for years after the adoption 
(either mandatory or voluntary) of IFRS by a given firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The independent variables 
are lagged one year (except for country-specific). All regressions include industry (2-digit SIC) and country fixed-effects. 
White-robust t-stats (absolute value) are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Total Proceeds (% of assets) 
 Total Issues Foreign Issues Domestic Issues 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IFRS 0.0047*** 0.0018*** 0.0029*** 
 (3.64) (2.68) (2.74) 
EU -0.0019 -0.0010 -0.0009 
 (-1.25) (-1.18) (-0.78) 
IFRS * EU 0.0032** 0.0019** 0.0014 
 (2.26) (2.25) (1.20) 
Log total assets -0.0022*** -0.0007*** -0.0015*** 
 (-6.81) (-3.50) (-6.01) 
Leverage -0.0095*** -0.0023* -0.0072*** 
 (-4.37) (-1.93) (-4.09) 
ROE -0.0116*** -0.0031*** -0.0085*** 
 (-6.93) (-2.92) (-6.75) 
MTB 0.0012*** 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 
 (6.01) (3.71) (5.60) 
Closely held 0.0026* 0.0002 0.0024** 
 (1.81) (0.26) (2.00) 
Foreign sales 0.0018 0.0001 0.0018 
 (1.28) (0.08) (1.55) 
ADR 0.0065*** 0.0041*** 0.0024* 
 (3.46) (3.36) (1.75) 
Capex 0.0060 0.0078 -0.0019 
 (0.89) (1.60) (-0.41) 
Need ext. fin. 0.0179*** 0.0073** 0.0106** 
 (3.22) (2.11) (2.43) 
Log total analysts 0.0007** 0.0006*** 0.0001 
 (2.18) (2.83) (0.50) 
USGAAP 0.0031 0.0051** -0.0020* 
 (1.21) (2.33) (-1.96) 
Crisis -0.0023 0.0015 -0.0038*** 
 (-1.60) (1.64) (-3.51) 
Mkt return -0.0027** -0.0001 -0.0026*** 
 (-2.45) (-0.13) (-3.02) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0106*** 0.0047*** 0.0060*** 
 (5.27) (3.11) (4.42) 
Smkt Cap. 0.0032*** -0.0006 0.0039*** 
 (2.58) (-0.84) (4.02) 
GDP growth 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.39) (1.42) (-0.81) 
GGO 0.0023 0.0010 0.0013 
 (1.20) (1.20) (0.76) 
Constant -0.0888*** -0.0427*** -0.0461*** 
 (-4.27) (-2.76) (-3.35) 
    
Observations 41,599 41,599 41,599 
R-squared 0.030 0.015 0.023 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
39 
 
Appendix A. List of variables 
 ADR: dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the U.S. in year t and zero otherwise. 
Sources: Citibank ADRs and data collected from the U.S. stock exchanges. 
 Analysts_p25: indicator variable that equals one if the number of analysts following a firm is in the 
bottom 25th percentile of the distribution in its country and 0 otherwise. 
 Capex: Capital expenditures (WorldScope item WC04601) divided by total assets. 
 Closely Held: Closely-held shares divided by total shares outstanding; WorldScope item: WC08021. 
 Crisis: dummy variable that identifies the recent financial crisis: it equals 1 from year 2007 on and 
zero otherwise. 
 EU: Indicator variable that equals one if the country belongs to the European Union and 0 otherwise. 
 Financing deficit: Following Frank and Goyal (2003), financing deficit is the sum of cash dividends 
(WC04551), investments, and net changes in working capital, less internal cash flows, scaled by total 
assets.  As in Doidge et al. (2010), we compute investments as the sum of capital expenditures 
(WC04601), additions to other assets (WC04651), net assets from acquisitions (WC04355), increase in 
investments (WC04760), other uses for investing (WC04795), less disposal of fixed assets 
(WC04351).  Net changes in working capital equals increases in cash and short-term investments 
(WC04851), less funds from operating activities (WC04831), less increase in short-term borrowings 
(WC04821).  Finally, internal cash flows include net income (WC04001), depreciation (WC01151), 
deferred tax assets (WC03263), extraordinary items (WC04225), other cash flows (WC04151), effects 
of exchange rate on cash, and other sources of financing (WC04446). 
 Foreign sales: Amount of international sales (WorldScope item WC07101) divided by total sales. 
 GDP per capita: GDP per capita in US$ reflecting 2000 constant prices. Source: World Bank WDI 
Database. 
 GDP growth: Annual GDP growth (%). Source: World Bank WDI Database. 
 GGO: A measure of a country's exogenous growth opportunities following Bekaert et al. (2007).  It is 
the log of the inner product of the vector of global industry PE ratios and the vector of country-specific 
industry weights.  Source:  DataStream. 
 Industry: 2-digit SIC code for major segment (DataStream - SIC code 1). 
 IFRS: Indicator variable that equals 1 for years after the adoption of IFRS and 0 otherwise (we 
identify whenever we include or exclude voluntary adopters in the analysis). 
 Leverage: Total debt in US$ 000 (WC03255) divided by total assets in US$ 000 (WC02999). Source: 
WorldScope. 
 Market return: Annual return on the domestic market. Source: DataStream. 
 MTB: Market-to-book (item MTBV). Source: DataStream. 
 Need ext. fin.: need for external equity financing as in Rajan and Zingales (1998): (capital 
expenditures – cash flow from operations)/ capital expenditures, where cash flow from operation = net 
income before extraordinary items - Accruals.  Accruals: (Change in current assets – change in cash) – 
(change in current liabilities – change in short-term debt) – depreciation. The ratio is scaled by 100. 
 ROE: Return on equity (item WC08301). Source: WorldScope. 
 Sales Growth: Percent change in sales from year t-1 to t. 
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Appendix A. List of variables. Continued. 
 Size_p25: Indicator variable that equals one if a firm's total assets are in the bottom 25th percentile of 
the distribution in its country and 0 otherwise. 
 Stmkt Cap.: Country-level variable that measures the stock market capitalization to the GDP. Source: 
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). 
 Time trend: Equals the value year t minus 1990. 
 Total Analysts: Total number of analysts following a firm by year. Source: I/B/E/S. 
 Total Assets: Total assets (in US$ 000, reflecting 2010 prices). WorldScope item WC02999. 
 Total Proceeds (domestic, foreign, and total): total proceeds from equity raisings by firm-year (in 
million US$, reflecting 2010 prices). “Domestic” refers to the fraction of shares issued in the domestic 
market and “Foreign” refers to the fraction of shares issued in foreign markets. Source: SDC Thomson 
Financial. 
 USGAAP: Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s accounting standards follow the U.S. GAAP in 
a given year, and zero otherwise (item WC07536). Source: WorldScope. 
 Voluntary adopters: Firms that adopt IFRS rules prior to the year of mandatory adoption in their 
country.  These firms are identified as in Daske et al. (2011) using the WorldScope definition of 
“Accounting Standards Followed” (WC07536). 
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